We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first define the MAXIMIZING MULTIPLE RESERVES (MMR) problem in single-parameter matroid environments, where the input is m valuation profiles v 1 , . . . , v m , indexed by the same n bidders, and the goal is to compute the vector r of (non-anonymous) reserve prices that maximizes the total revenue obtained on these profiles by the VCG mechanism with reserves r. We prove that the problem is AP X-hard, even in the special case of single-item environments, and give a polynomial-time -approximation algorithm for it in arbitrary matroid environments.
INTRODUCTION
A basic issue in the design and deployment of revenue-maximizing auctions is the determination of appropriate reserve prices. For example, consider the well-studied problem of selecting an anonymous reserve price in a second-price (Vickrey) auction for a single item -equivalently, an opening bid in an eBay auction.
1 There are several versions of the problem, depending on the informational assumptions made.
Baysian optimization. The standard economic approach is to assume a prior distribution over the valuations of the bidders participating in the auction, and to maximize expected revenue with respect to this distribution. If bidders' valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution that satisfies some modest technical conditions ("regularity"), then setting the reserve price equal to the distribution's monopoly price yields an optimal auction [Myerson 1981] . [Chawla et al. 2007] , [Hartline and Roughgarden 2009] , and [Alaei et al. 2015] provide guidance on how to set the reserve price when the i.i.d. or regularity assumptions are relaxed.
Offline optimization. Given m arbitrary valuation profiles v 1 , . . . , v m (each an n-vector, where n is the number of bidders), the goal here is to determine the reserve price of a second-price auction that maximizes the average auction revenue across these profiles. There is always an optimal reserve price equal to some bidder's valuation in one the m profiles, so there are at most mn different reserve prices that need to be tried. Thus the problem is easy to solve in polynomial time.
Batch learning. In this version, there is an unknown distribution F over bidders' valuations. A learning algorithm is given m i.i.d. samples from F , and must then output a reserve price. The goal is to output a reserve price that achieves expected revenue (w.r.t. fresh draws from F ) close to that obtained by the best reserve price (for F ), with high probability over the samples. This problem was studied implicitly in [Dhangwatnotai et al. 2010] and explicitly by [Medina and Mohri 2014] and [Huang et al. 2015] .
Online no-regret learning. In online learning, valuation profiles v 1 , . . . , v T arrive one at a time, and at time t a learning algorithm chooses a reserve price as a function of the previously seen profiles v 1 , . . . , v t−1 . The goal is to choose reserve prices over time so that the time-averaged revenue is almost as high as that achieved by the best fixed reserve price in hindsight. Versions of this problem were studied by [Kleinberg and Leighton 2003] , [Blum and Hartline 2005] , and [Cesa-Bianchi et al. 2013 ].
There are well known connections between these different problems. For example, an efficient exact or approximate algorithm for the offline optimization problem implies, in "black-box" fashion, an efficient learning algorithm for the batch learning problem with the same approximation factor (namely the "empirical risk minimizer" (ERM), see e.g. [Anthony and Bartlett 1999] ). An efficient exact algorithm for the offline problem can also be translated into an efficient online no-regret learning algorithm (see e.g. [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2006] ).
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In this paper, we study the problem of computing or learning non-anonymous reserve prices, where a different reserve price r i can be used for each bidder i. For example, in a single-item second-price auction with reserves r 1 , . . . , r n , the winner is the highest bidder who clears her reserve (if any), and the selling price is either her reserve price or the second-highest bid of a bidder who cleared her own reserve price, whichever is larger.
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All four genres of problems are relevant and interesting with non-anonymous reserve prices; we study the latter three in this work.
Baysian optimization. [Hartline and Roughgarden 2009] , extending [Chawla et al. 2007] , study the power of non-anonymous reserve prices in Bayesian settings, where bidders' valuations are independently but not identically distributed. The main results show that setting each bidder's reserve to the monopoly price for her distribution yields a mechanism with near-optimal expected revenue in many scenarios. [Cesa-Bianchi et al. 2013 ] are interesting and non-trivial because they apply even when the price-setter receives only limited feedback from each auction. 3 These are called "eager reserves" in [Dhangwatnotai et al. 2010] . With "lazy reserves," the winner is the highest bidder, if she clears her reserve (and no one, otherwise), and the selling price is the maximum of her reserve and the second-highest bid overall. Note that whenever a sale occurs with lazy reserves, a sale would also occur with eager reserves (but not vice versa). Eager reserves are superior from both a welfare and revenue standpoint; see [Paes Leme et al. 2016 ] for these and many other interesting comparisons. 4 These results are extended to lazy monopoly reserves in [Dhangwatnotai et al. 2010] .
Offline optimization. Given m arbitrary valuation profiles v 1 , . . . , v m , each indexed by the same set of bidders, the goal is now to compute one reserve price per bidder to maximize the average revenue of the second-price auction with reserves across these profiles. In contrast to the anonymous reserve price setting, this optimization problem is non-trivial: there are now m n different price vectors that could be optimal. This problem has not been studied previously, except for the independent work by [Paes Leme et al. 2016] , who proved that the problem is N P -hard.
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Batch learning. The learning algorithm must now compute, based on samples, one reserve price per bidder. This problem was studied by [Morgenstern and Roughgarden 2015] : their "1-level auctions" correspond exactly to second-price auctions with non-anonymous reserve prices.
6 Their work focuses on sample complexity bounds. Their learning algorithm uses an algorithm for offline optimization as a subroutine, but they do not address its computational efficiency.
Online no-regret learning. The online learning algorithm must now compute one reserve price per bidder in each time step, and perform almost as well as the best fixed non-anonymous reserve prices in hindsight. This problem has not been previously considered.
We study the problem of computing and learning multiple reserve prices primarily because of its basic nature, but we note that non-anonymous reserve prices are used in practice (often in a disguised form, for better optics). For example, in sponsored search auctions a "quality score" is associated with each advertiser, and different quality scores translate to different effective reserve prices for different advertisers (see e.g. [Athey and Nekipelov 2012] ). Along the same lines, in the upcoming FCC Incentive Auction (for re-allocating spectrum licenses from TV advertisers to mobile broadband companies), a particular formula is used to set different opening bids for different participants, depending on the market share and perceived value of the participant's license (see e.g. [Cramton et al. 2015] ).
Our Results
We first consider the offline optimization problem MAXIMIZING MULTIPLE RESERVES (MMR) in general matroid environments (see Section 2 for background). The input is m valuation profiles v 1 , . . . , v m , indexed by the same n bidders. The goal is to compute the vector r of reserve prices that maximizes the total revenue obtained on these profiles by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with reserves r. We prove that the problem is AP X-hard (i.e., hard to approximate better than some fixed constant), even in the special case of single-item environments, and give a polynomial-time 1 2 − times that obtained with the best reserve prices for F .
We then consider the online no-regret learning problem. The 1 2 -approximation algorithm for the offline problem does not automatically imply an approximately no-regret online learning algorithm. 7 We show how to exploit the special structure of the MMR problem to translate our offline approximation algorithm into an online learning algorithm that achieves time-averaged revenue at least 1 2 times that of the best fixed reserve prices in hindsight, less an o(1) error term (as T → ∞). This positive result applies to arbitrary matroid environments. On the negative side, we show that, quite generally, computational hardness for the offline optimization problem translates to computational hardness for obtaining vanishing time-averaged regret.
8 (This is not obvious because an online algorithm might achieve high revenue with different reserves at different times, while never figuring out the best fixed reserves in hindsight.) This general translation may be of independent interest. In any case, our hardness result for the MMR problem carries over to the problem of online no-regret learning, even in the special case of single-item auction environments.
PRELIMINARIES

Matroid Environments
For our purposes, an environment is defined by a set E of bidders, and a non-empty collection I ⊆ 2 E of feasible sets of bidders, which are the subsets of bidders that can simultaneously "win". For example, in a k-unit auction with unit-demand bidders, I is all subsets of E that have size at most k. Each bidder has a private valuation for winning. Depending on the setting, bidders' valuations can be drawn from a (possibly unknown) distribution, or arbitrary.
We consider matroid environments, where (i) the set system (E, I) is downwardclosed, meaning that if T ∈ I and S ⊆ T , then S ∈ I; and (ii) the exchange property holds, stating that whenever S, T ∈ I with |T | < |S|, there is some i ∈ S \ T such that T ∪ {i} ∈ I. Examples of matroid environments include digital goods (where I = 2 E ), k-unit auctions (where I is all subsets of size at most k), and certain unit-demand matching markets (corresponding to transversal matroids).
The VCG Mechanism with Non-Anonymous Reserves
Name the bidders E = {1, 2, . . . , n}. A (deterministic) mechanism M comprises an allocation rule x that maps every bid vector b to a characteristic vector of a feasible set (in {0, 1} n ), and a payment rule p that maps every bid vector b to a non-negative payment vector in [0, ∞) n . We assume that every bidder i aims to maximize its quasilinear utility
, where v i is its private valuation for winning. We call a mechanism M truthful if for every bidder i and fixed bids b −i of the other bidders, bidder i maximizes its utility by setting its bid b i to its private valuation v i . Since we only consider truthful mechanisms, in the rest of the paper we use valuations and bids interchangeably. The efficiency or welfare of the outcome of a mechanism is the sum of the winners' valuations, and the revenue is the sum of the winners' payments.
The VCG mechanism chooses the feasible set S ∈ I that maximizes the welfare i∈S v i . Each winner in the mechanism pays the smallest bid at which she would continue to win; this results in a truthful mechanisms. In a single-item setting, this is just the second-price auction.
Let r i be a reserve price for bidder i. The VCG mechanism with reserves r works as follows, given bids v: (1) remove all bidders i with v i < r i ; (2) run the VCG mechanism on the remaining bidders to determine the winners; (3) charge each winning bidder i the larger of r i and its VCG payment in step (2). This is again a truthful mechanism (for any r).
Matroid environments are special in that the VCG mechanism can be implemented using a greedy algorithm. Specifically, to choose the winners: sort the bidders in order of decreasing bids, and in one pass in this order, add a bidder to the winner set if and only if doing so preserves feasibility. It is well known and easy to prove that this algorithm computes the welfare-maximizing outcome.
This greedy algorithm also reveals what the payments are. Consider some winning bidder i. As a thought experiment, imagine re-running the greedy algorithm without i, and let f (i) be the first winning bidder after which it would be infeasible to add w the winner set (if any). The VCG payment of i is the valuation of f (i), or zero if f (i) does not exist.
THE OFFLINE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM: ALGORITHMS
The offline MMR problem is interesting in its own right, and algorithms for it also serve as a useful starting point for designing online MMR algorithms. We warm-up with the single-item case (Section 3.1) and then address the general matroid environment case (Section 3.2).
Warm-Up: The Single-Item Case
In the single-item special case of the MMR problem, the input is valuation profiles v 1 , . . . , v m , and the goal is to choose (non-anonymous) reserve prices r to maximize the average revenue of a second-price auction with reserves r on these profiles. Without loss of generality, each reserve price r i is equal to the valuation of bidder i in one of the m valuation profiles. (This still leaves a search space of m n reserve price vectors.) Observe the tension in setting the reserve price r i for a bidder i: increasing it may increase revenue on profiles where i is a winner (provided r i stays below v i ), but it may also decrease revenue if r i passes v i , even when i is only the second-highest bidder (v i was previously setting the price of the winner). The following algorithm balances these considerations.
MMR Algorithm (Single-Item Case)
for each bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n do let Si denote the profiles where i has the highest valuation; let v j (2) denote the second highest valuation in v j ;
, and 0 otherwise end return either r or the all-zero vector, whichever generates more revenue;
In words, q j (r i ) represents the additional revenue obtained by the reserve price r i from bidder i on day j, above and beyond the revenue already obtained by a reserve price of 0.
This algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time. Each reserve price r i can be computed independently, and there are only m different relevant choices for each.
LEMMA 3.1. The algorithm above is a 1 2 -approximation algorithm for the MMR problem in single-item environments.
PROOF. Fix an input v 1 , . . . , v m and let r * denote the optimal reserve prices. The revenue obtained from a valuation profile v j with j ∈ S i is at most max{v
(If the item is sold to someone other than the highest bidder, then the selling price is at most v j (2) .) Overall, the optimal revenue can be upper bounded by
The all-zero reserves obtain revenue equal to the first term on the right-hand side. The reserves r computed by the algorithm above obtain, by construction, revenue that is at least the second term on the right-hand side (with r i chosen to maximize the ith inner sum). The better of these two reserve price vectors earns revenue at least 1 2 times the maximum possible.
Example 3.2. Our analysis in Lemma 3.1 is tight: for every > 0, there is an input where the algorithm achieves less than (1/2 + ) times the optimal revenue. The bad input is as follows: let n be an integer to be chosen later, and let there be two bidders and n valuation profiles. The first bidder has valuation n on the first day, valuation 0 on the second day, and valuation 1 + 1/n on every other day. The second bidder has valuation 0 on the first day, valuation 1 + 1/n on the second day, and valuation 1 on every other day. For this input, the all-zero vector will achieve a revenue of (n − 2). Also, r will be the vector (n, 1 + 1/n), which achieves a revenue of (n + 1 + 1/n). However, choosing r to be (n, 1) results in a revenue of (2n − 1). When n > 5 4 −1 + 1 2 , the algorithm's revenue is less than (1/2 + ) times the optimal revenue.
An Offline MMR Algorithm
We now consider matroid environments. The new complication is that there are multiple winners, and we need to determine the relationship between the winners in the VCG mechanism (without reserves) and the winner bidders in an optimal solution.
The generalization of our previous algorithm is as follows.
MMR Algorithm (Matroid Case)
for each bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n do let Si denote the profiles where i is a winner in the VCG mechanism (without reserves); for j ∈ Si, let p j i denote i's payment in the VCG mechanism (without reserves) with the profile v j ;
, and 0 otherwise end return either r or the all-zero vector, whichever leads to more revenue;
As in the single-item special case, it is straightforward to implement this algorithm so that it runs in polynomial time.
As a lead-up to the analysis, the next three propositions review well-known properties of matroids and the VCG mechanism (see e.g. [Talwar 2003 ]). From the definition of VCG payments, we have: PROPOSITION 3.4. Suppose that the winners in the VCG mechanism with zero reserves are W , and that i ∈ W but j ∈ W , and that W \ {i} ∪ {j} is a feasible set. Then the VCG payment of i is at least the valuation of j.
The following proposition explains what happens when a winner is removed from the auction: PROPOSITION 3.5. Suppose the current winners of a matroid auction are W , and we then remove some winner w ∈ W from the auction. Then the new set of winners will be W \ {w} ∪ p(w), if p(w) exists, or W \ {w} otherwise.
LEMMA 3.6 (REVENUE DECOMPOSITION LEMMA). Consider a valuation profile v and reserve prices r . Let the winners of the VCG mechanism with profile v and no reserves be W , with p i denoting the payment of i. Then, the revenue of r on v is at most
, and 0 otherwise. PROOF. The winning set W with zero reserves is a basis of the matroid of feasible subsets. The reserves r result in some set of winners W . Extend W to a basis using the exchange property (Section 2), and apply Proposition 3.3 to get a bijection from a superset of W to W . Ignoring elements not in W , we get a injection f from W to W . Furthermore, we are guaranteed that for every bidder i ∈ W , W \ {i} ∪ {f (i)} is feasible. Applying Proposition 3.4, this means that whenever f (i) = i, p f (i) is at least the valuation of i.
Next, consider a bidder i ∈ W . We claim that increasing the reserves for bidders other than i (from 0 to some positive amount) can never cause i to lose or to pay more than p i . For the first statement, the only effect of reserve prices on the winning set is to remove bidders before invoking the greedy algorithm. By Proposition 3.5, removing a winner and re-running the greedy algorithm simply causes them to be replaced (i.e., no other bidders are removed as a consequence). Trivially, removing a nonwinner has no effect on the winning set. Thus if i's reserve is not changed, it remains a winner. Similarly, removing other bidders can only decrease the valuation of the losing bidder that sets i's price (recall Section 2).
These two facts imply that, for every winner i ∈ W , we can use f to find a winner f (i) ∈ W such that either (i) i's valuation, and hence contribution to the revenue of r , is at most p f (i) or (ii) f (i) = i and i only pays more than p i to the extent that r i is larger than p i (while also being at most v i ). The quanity in (ii) is precisely q(r * i ). Because f is an injection, we can sum over all w ∈ W to get the inequality in the lemma statement.
The lemma easily implies that our algorithm is a 1 2 -approximation. THEOREM 3.7. The algorithm above is a 1 2 -approximation algorithm for the MMR problem in matroid environments.
PROOF. Fix an input v
1 , . . . , v m and let r * denote the optimal reserve prices. Let W j denote the winners in the VCG mechanism with profile v j and no reserves, and p j i the payment made by a bidder i ∈ W j . Applying Lemma 3.6 to each profile v j and summing over j, the total revenue obtained by r * is at most
where S i and q j are defined as in the algorithm description. The all-zero reserves obtain total revenue equal to the first term on the right-hand side. The reserves r computed by the algorithm above earn revenue that is at least the second term on the right-hand side (again, with r i chosen to maximize the ith inner sum). The better of these two reserve price vectors earns revenue at least 1 2 times the maximum possible.
Consequences for Batch Learning
Recall the batch learning problem mentioned in the Introduction: valuation profiles v 1 , . . . , v m are sampled i.i.d. from an unknown distribution F and given as a batch to a learning algorithm. The responsibility of the learning algorithm is to output non-anonymous reserve prices r that earn expected revenue (on a new i.i.d. draw from F ) within of that obtained by the optimal non-anonymous reserve prices (for F ). [Morgenstern and Roughgarden 2015] show that, information-theoretically, m = Ω( H 2 2 n log n) samples are enough to in principle compute such reserve prices in matroid environments (with high probability over the samples, and where H is a bound on the maximum valuation). This guarantee is realized by the "empirical risk minimizing (ERM)" algorithm, which simply solves the offline optimization problem (using the samples as input) and returns the result. [Morgenstern and Roughgarden 2015] did not address computational complexity issues in their work. Since the offline optimization problem is N P -hard to approximate to within some constant (Theorem 5.2 below), the ERM algorithm cannot be implemented in polynomial time (unless P = N P ).
On the positive side, the same machinery (based on "uniform convergence") used to establish the guarantee of the ERM algorithm applies to approximation algorithms for the offline optimization problem. Thus our 1 2 -approximation algorithm for the MMR problem (Theorem 3.7) can be used as a black box to efficiently compute, from m = Ω( H 2 2 n log n) i.i.d. samples from an unknown distribution F , reserve prices that obtain expected revenue at least half that of the maximum possible (with high probability, and less ).
ONLINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS
Regret-Minimization
This section considers the online no-regret learning problem mentioned in the Introduction. Here, valuation profiles v 1 , . . . , v T arrive one at a time (indexed by the same set of n bidders in a matroid environment), and at time t a learning algorithm chooses reserve prices r t as a function of the previously seen profiles v 1 , . . . , v t−1 . We use R(r t , v t ) to denote the revenue earned by the VCG mechanism with reserve prices r t on the valuation profile v t . The goal is to choose reserve prices over time so that the time-averaged revenue is almost as high as that achieved by the best fixed reserve prices in hindsight. Formally, the regret of a sequence r 1 , . . . , r T of reserve prices with respect to a sequence of valuation profiles
and the goal is drive this quantity toward 0 as quickly as possible (as T grows large).
Since regret corresponds to additive error, we normalize valuations to lie in the range
We prove in Section 6 that this notion of regret is too optimistic. Our main positive result is an online learning algorithm with vanishing α-regret, a quantity defined by [Kakade et al. 2009 ] to introduce approximation into no-regret guarantees:
An Online MMR Algorithm
We now work toward an algorithm for the online setting with good α-regret. A natural idea is to apply the existing machinery for translating offline α-approximation algorithms into online learning algorithms with vanishing α-regret. However, these techniques do not immediately apply in our setting. First, the number of actions (corresponding to reserve price vectors) is exponential in n, so we cannot separately track the past performance of each reserve price vector. The well-known "follow-the-perturbedleader (FTPL)" algorithm of [Kalai and Vempala 2003 ] (based on the idea of [Hannan 1957] ) can be used to translate certain α-approximation algorithms to online no-α-regret algorithms for arbitrary action spaces (subsets of R n ), provided the payoff in each time step is a linear function of the chosen action. In our setting, the corresponding function R(r t , v t ) is not linear in r t or v t . Nonetheless, we show how to combine the main ideas of the FTPL algorithm and of our offline approximation algorithm in Section 3 to obtain an online learning algorithm with vanishing 1 2 -regret.
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Our learning algorithm, defined for an arbitrary matroid environment, is as follows.
MMR Algorithm (Online)
set K = √ T ; set = log K/T ; for each round t = 1, 2, . . . , T do for each bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n do let Si denote the previous rounds where i is a winner in the VCG mechanism (without reserves); for j ∈ Si, let p j i denote i's payment in the VCG mechanism (without reserves) with the profile v j ; for each reserve price r = 1/K, 2/K, . . . , 1 do draw a random variable Xi,r from the standard exponential distribution (each x ≥ 0 has probability density e −x ); choose Yi,r to be + 1 Xi,r or − 1 Xi,r uniformly at random; end Choose r 
probability; end
It is straightforward to implement this algorithm so that it runs in O(n √ T ) at each time step, and O(nT 3/2 ) time overall. A key point is that each reserve price r mined independently for each bidder i, enabling us to keep track of only Kn quantities (as opposed to a quantity for each of the K n reserve price vectors).
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The analysis challenge is to show that our online algorithm earns revenue comparable to each term of the Revenue Decomposition Lemma (Lemma 3.6), despite having to produce reserve prices before seeing the valuation profile for which they will be used. THEOREM 4.1. The 1 2 -regret of the online learning algorithm above is O(n log T /T ).
PROOF. Fix an input sequence v 1 , . . . , v T and let r denote the optimal reserve prices. Let W t denote the winners in the VCG mechanism with profile v t and no reserves, and p t i the payment made by a bidder i ∈ W t . Lemma 3.6 again implies, after summing over t, that the total revenue obtained by r is at most T t=1 i∈Wt
where S i and q t are defined as in the algorithm description. Choosing the all-zero reserve prices every round obtains total revenue equal to the first term on the righthand side. We will prove that choosing the r t computed by the algorithm every round obtains total expected revenue equal to the second term on the right-hand side, less an error of O(n √ T log T ). The algorithm limits itself to reserve prices from the set {1/K, 2/K, . . . , 1} rather than [0, 1]. Then, for each bidder i, it tries to find a reserve r i that maximizes t∈Si q t (r i ), with perturbations as in the FTPL algorithm. [Kalai and Vempala 2003 ] showed that in an online decision-making setting with K actions (a.k.a. "experts"), each incurring a cost in [0, 1] each round, the expected cost of FTPL algorithm (with weights Y i,r rechosen every round as in our algorithm) is at most the cost of the best fixed expert plus T + O(log K) . Our algorithm treats each possible reserve as an action and considers 1 − q t to be the cost of choosing an expert in round t. Note that our algorithm runs the FTPL algorithm every round for bidder i, but S i only increases when i turned out to be a winner in the VCG mechanism without reserves. When we only consider rounds where i is a winner in the VCG mechanism without reserves, the guarantee becomes:
with second inequality following from our choice of . However, the r in this equation is limited to the set {1/K, 2/K, . . . , 1}. This restriction costs at most
T revenue (we chose K to balance this term with the regret of FTPL), which folds into the O(
Summing over all bidders i, choosing r t every round gives expected revenue at least
We conclude that randomly returning either r t or the all-zero vector at each round t yields expected revenue at least 1 2 times the maximum revenue achieved by any 10 The algorithm is described for the case where the time horizon T is known in advance. Standard doubling arguments extend the algorithm and analysis to the case of an a priori unknown time horizon.
fixed set of reserve prices, less an error of O(n √ T log T ). Hence our algorithm has O(n log T /T ) (time-averaged) 1 2 -regret, as claimed.
OFFLINE LOWER BOUND
In this section, we prove that the MMR problem is N P -hard to approximate within a (1 + ) factor for some constant > 0, even in the special case of single-item environments. Section 6 extends this hardness result to the online no-regret learning problem.
Our proof approach is to provide an L-reduction, in the sense of [Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 1988] , from DOMINATINGSET on graphs of bounded degree to the MMR problem.
Definition 5.1 ( [Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 1988] ). Suppose Π and Π are two maximization problems. We say Π L-reduces to Π if there are poly-time algorithms f, g and constants α, β > 0 such that given an instance I of Π:
(1) Algorithm f produces an instance I of Π such that OP T (I ) ≤ αOP T (I). This definition is designed so that L-reductions compose and if Π L-reduces to Π , then a (1 + )-approximation for Π yields a (1 + αβ )-approximation for Π. The DOM-INATINGSET problem on graphs of bounded degree is hard to approximate to within some constant, so our L-reduction proves the same hardness result for the MMR problem.
THEOREM 5.2. DOMINATINGSET on graphs of bounded degree B L-reduces to the MMR problem in single-item environments with α = 3B + 2 and β = 1.
PROOF. Suppose we have a Dominating Set-B instance G = (V, E). Suppose it has n nodes and the smallest dominating set uses k nodes. We produce an MMR instance with n bidders and 2n valuation profiles. The profiles are divided into two groups: n blue profiles and n red profiles. For convenience, we allow valuations in [0, 2] rather than [0, 1] (by scaling, it doesn't matter). The valuation of bidder i in the j th blue profile will be 1 if i = j or (i, j) ∈ E and 0 otherwise. The valuation of bidder i in the j th red profile will be 2 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
For every bidder, the only valuations they ever have are 0, 1, and 2. Hence the only possible reserve choices for each bidder are 1 or 2 (we can always round up to the nearest valuation). We associate a reserve price of 1 with choosing the node to be in the dominating set and a reserve price of 2 with not choosing the node. In a blue profile, a bidder can only clear a reserve of 1. In a red profile, the relevant bidder faces no competition, and hence a second-price auction with research only extracts the revenue from them by choosing the reserve of 2. The blue profiles encode the dominating set constraint, while the red profiles encode the objective to minimize nodes chosen.
Suppose there is a dominating set of size k. Choosing the associated reserve prices, as described above, achieves a revenue of 3n − k: we achieve a revenue of 1 in the blue profiles since we cover them all by definition, a revenue of 1 from each red profile corresponding to one of the k chosen nodes, and a revenue of 2 from each of the other n − k red profiles.
Since every node in the original problem covered at most B + 1 nodes, the original optimum was at least n/(B + 1). Combining this bound with our argument above, the optimal revenue is at most 3B+2 B+1 n. Hence we can choose α = 3B + 2.
Next, we show that if there are non-anonymous reserve prices that get within c of the new optimum, then we can produce a dominating set that gets within c of the old optimum (with a polynomial-time algorithm). Suppose we achieve a revenue of 3n − k for some k. We claim that we can assume that we achieve a revenue of 1 in every blue profile. For if we do not, then consider any bidder who has a valuation of 1 in that profile. Changing their reserve to 1 nets an additional 1 revenue in this profile, and loses at most 1 revenue (from their red profile). Hence in polynomial time, we can transform a solution to one that only has more revenue and achieves a revenue of 1 every blue profile. But then our association of nodes with reserve prices gives us a dominating set of size at most k. This completes the proof with β = 1.
Tight approximation bounds are not known for bounded-degree dominating set and related problems, and as a result there is a gap between our lower bound in Theorem 5.2 and our 1 2 -approximation algorithm. Using the state-of-the-art result of [Chlebik and Chlebikova 2008] (with B = 5), we get that the MMR problem cannot be approximated better than a factor of 884 885 . This inapproximability result holds for generally for estimating the value of an optimal solution to the MMR problem; this will be useful in the next section.
COROLLARY 5.3. It is N P -hard to distinguish between single-item MMR instances in which the maximum-possible revenue is at least a given parameter X, and those instances in which the maximum-possible revenue is at most 884 885 X, even when X ≥ m 2 .
ONLINE LOWER BOUNDS
Online MMR Lower Bound
Our hardness result for offline optimization (Theorem 5.2) translates to an analogous hardness result for online learning. This is not immediately obvious because an online learning algorithm could conceivably achieve high revenue with different reserves at different times, while never figuring out the best fixed reserves in hindsight. Our randomized polynomial-time reduction is the following (where α ∈ ( ); for rounds t = 1, 2, . . . , T do ask A for its next choice of reserves r t and then give it a uniformly random valuation profile from {v 1 , . . . , v m }; end return YES if at least one of the r t results in strictly more than 884 885
X total revenue on {v 1 , . . . , v m }, and NO otherwise;
We note that whenever the resulting offline algorithm says "yes" it must be correct -it finds a reserve price vector witnessing the lower bound on the optimal objective function value. Thus the algorithm has one-sided error (with false negatives only). For the purposes of the following theorem, we say that an online learning algorithm has no α-regret if for every fixed constant > 0, the number of rounds needed to drive the α-regret down to is bounded by a polynomial in the number of bidders n. For example, any regret bound of the form poly(n)/T δ (for any fixed δ > 0) satisfies this condition.
General Offline to Online Inapproximability Reduction
The reduction of Theorem 6.1 can generalized to a wide class of online problems. Suppose we have an online problem where every round, the algorithm commits to an action and then receives a payoff vector with description length n which can be used to compute the payoff of any action in poly(n) time. Payoffs lie in the range [0, 1]. The corresponding offline problem is to compute the best fixed action given m (succinct descriptions of) payoff vectors. If the offline problem cannot be approximated, then neither can the online problem: THEOREM 6.2. Suppose it is NP-hard to distinguish between offline instances in which the maximum payoff is at least a given parameter X, and those instances in which the maximum payoff is at most αX, even when X ≥ βm for some constants α, β > 0. Then unless N P ⊆ RP , for all constants α > α there is no polynomial-time algorithm for the online problem with no α -regret.
PROOF. The proof of Theorem 6.1 did not rely on any specific facts about the MMR problem. We can transform any online algorithm A with α -regret f (T ) into A with α -regret f (T /m) and which guarantees it outputs the same action for m rounds in a row. Choosing the smallest T (the number of blocks or equivalently, random samples) such that f (T ) is at most 1 2 β(α − α) requires T to only be poly(n). This choice of T guarantees the expected average payoff of an output of A is at least α · OP T minus 1 2 βm(α − α). For YES instances, this shows the expected average total payoff is at least α +α 2 X, so with constant probability some action returned by A will have total payoff more than αX. For NO instances, all actions have total payoff at most αX. This RP algorithm would solve an NP-hard problem, contradicting our hypothesis. Hence no such online algorithm can exist.
